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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND C. HANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MARY J. HANSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
An appeal by the defendant, Mary J. Hansen, from 
an Amended Decree of Divorce entered against her in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable George E. BaJlif, Judge, presid-
ing. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted the plaintiff-respondent a 
Decree of Divorce against the defendant-appellant upon 
the grounds of great mental distress, pursuant to Sbction 
30-3-1 (7), U. C. A. (1953), as amended. 
Case No. 
13985 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent prays that the Amended Decree 
of Divorce be affirmed and that he be awarded his costs 
incurred herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff-respondent finds the defendant-appel-
lant Statement of the Facts inconsistent with the facts 
in the above-entitled matter in the following particulars: 
1. The testimony of psychiatrist Delbert P. Pear-
son, M. D., was that the acts of the defendant did cause 
the plaintiff mental anguish (Trial Trans. 38). 
2. In addition to the award set out in Appellant's 
Statement of Facts, the lower court awarded the defen-
dant-appellant a life estate in the mobile home and lot 
owned jointly by the parties; ordered the plaintiff to 
pay the premiums on the Blue Cross-Blue Shield medical 
insurance policy, and awarded her the beneficial interest 
in the life insurance policies (Tr. 50-52). 
3. The xmcontroverted evidence was that for the 
two years immediately preceding the trial the defendant 
had been gainfully employed and was earning approxi-
mately $2.00 per hour, 40 hours per week (Trial Trans. 
42). 
4. The defendant contended that her medicine bills 
were approximately $100.00 per month but her own evi-
dence showed that her needs were only $70.00 per month. 
(Tr. 74). 
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5. An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered in-
creasing the alimony to be paid by the plaintiff to the 
defendant from $30.00 to $70.00 per month. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ITS FINDING OF FACTS TO SUPPORT A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Plaintiff sought and was granted a Divorce Decree 
pursuant to Section 30-3-1 (7) U. C. A. (1953), as 
amended, upon the grounds of great mental distress. The 
Court found cruel treatment causing the plaintiff great 
mental distress after a Decree of Sepanaite Maintenance 
was entered between the parties in August of 1972. 
This Court has set down rules for review in divorce 
cases, providing thait the actions of the trial count are 
presumed valid and correct unless the appellant sustains 
the burden of showing that the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against the Decree of the Court. 
. . . (D)ue to the prerogatives and advantaged 
position of the trial court, we pursue that broad 
authorization under certain rules of review which 
are now well established: Its actions are in-
dulged with a presumption of validity and cor-
rectness and the burden is upon the appellant 
to show a basis for upsetting them: either (1) 
that findings have been made when the evidence 
clearly preponderates the other way, or (2) that 
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there has been a mfeunderstanding or misap-
plication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, or (3) that it appears plainly 
that there has been such an abuse of discretion 
that an inequity or injustice has resulted. Hard-
ing v. Harding, 26 Utah 2nd 277, 488 P. 2d 308, 
310, (1971). 
There is no evidence before this Court upon which 
it might find the facts preponderate against a showing 
of mental cruelty. The defendant, in her own testimony, 
stated that the parties had not had a friendly discussion 
in approximately two years (Trial Trans, 40). 
The defendant argues that the incidents the plain-
tiff testified to which caused him great mental anguish, 
surely could not cause a retired naval officer with the 
plaintiff's background to be mentally distressed. The 
defendant-appellant further argues that the incidents 
testified to by the plaintiff were nothing more than the 
natural and usual disagreements and misunderstandings 
that accompany any normal marriage. No one, after 
reading the transcript, could reasonably say that the 
plaintiff and the defendant have a normal marital rela-
tionship. 
Mental cruelty causing great mental anguish "must 
be ascertained from the facts of each case, individually, 
in light of the sensibilities of the particular person; hence, 
the ultimate question is not so much the conduct of the 
defendant, but the effect of such conduct on the plain-
tiff." Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P. 
2d 923 (1962). The trial court had the opportunity to 
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see the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor and credi-
bility. 
This is simply not a case where this Court can say 
that the evidence clearly preponderates against the De-
cree of the district court. The trial judge was able to 
evaluate the demeanor of those who testified to the indi-
vidual sensibilities of the plaintiff, and therefore, should 
have been able to accurately determine if the particular 
incidents, in this particular case, constituted mental 
cruelty toward the plaiintiff. 
The trial court found that there was substantial and 
satisfactory evidence upon which to grant the plaintiff a 
divorce. This Court has stated that "when the promotion 
of happiness, welfare, health, and morality of the parties 
and their children are not at stake in a divorce, then 
there is no public interest in the preservation of the mar-
iage." Stevenson, supra, at 924. 
It appears that the only reason the defendant does 
not want a divorce is a purely financial one, the loss of 
the Champus insurance benefits, and therefore, there 
being no other circumstances which would justify deny-
ing this particular divorce, it should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN THE AMOUNT OF 
ALIMONY AWARDED. 
Very recently this Court, in the case of Mitchell v. 
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Mitchell, Utah 2d , 527 P. 2d 1359 (1974), stated 
that 
. . . (I)n a divorce action, the trial court has 
considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting 
financial and property interests, and its actions 
are indulged with a presumption of validity. 
The biorden is upon the appellant to prove that 
. . . a serious inequitay has resulted as to mani-
fest a dear abuse of discreition. Id. at 1360. 
The record reveals that the trial court considered 
and reconsidered the economic and medical condition of 
the parties, the fact that they were both self-supporting, 
that they had not lived together for some time, the fact 
that the defendant was awarded practically all of the 
property, and income property that was accumulated 
during the marriage, and the fact that the plaintiff had 
arranged to provide for the defendant's medical needs as 
best he could, in arriving at its final Decree. 
There is no showing of any abuse of discretion by 
the trial court. Moreover, the record indicates that the 
Oourt reconsidered its original alimony award and in-
creased the award from $30.00 to $70.00 a month (Tr. 
75-77), a figure which approximates the medication needs 
of the defendant (Tr. 74). 
The circumstances in this case are similar to the 
facts in the Utah case of Ghost v. Ghost, 28 Utah 2d 396, 
490 P. 2d 339 (1971), where due to the divorce of the 
parties the defendant lost her right to retirement income 
of approximately $80.00 per month. The Court held that 
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the loss to the defendant of the $80.00 and the trial court's 
failure to award alimony did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion, 490 P. 2d at 340. In view of the circumstances, 
it was certainly not an abuse of the trial court's discre-
tion to fail to award $30.00 more in alimony. In Chris-
tensen v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 283, 444 P. 2d 511 
(1968), this Court stated: 
. . . (W)hether we as individual judges would 
or would not have arrived at the exact same 
formula as to what the most practical and just 
treatment of the economic expects (sic) of the 
situation is not the question on . . . appeal. Even 
though it is the established rule that divorce 
cases being in equity, it is the duty of this court 
to review and weigh the evidence, it is equally 
true that we have invariably recognized the ad-
vantaged position of the trial judge and given 
deference to his findings and judgment, declar-
ing that they should not be upset unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them, or 
unless the decree works such an injustice that 
the equity and good conscience demand that it 
be revised. 444 P. 2d at 512, 513. 
The defendant-appellant has failed to show any in-
equity, injustice or abuse of discretion in the Amended 
Decree of Divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
The record clearly preponderates in favor, not 
against the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff estab-
lished, by substantial and satisfactory evedence, that he 
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should be granted a divorce. The trial court, taking into 
consideration all of the peirtinent factors, made what it 
considered to be an equitable alimony award and prop-
erty settlement. This matter should be affirmed with 
costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN K. YOUNG 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
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